


### Within Case Analysis: India-Pakistan Asymmetric Rivalry

Figure 3: India-Pakistan Conflict Dynamics



To lend context to the findings, I briefly discuss how the alliance dynamics played out in the India-Pakistan rivalry. Paul (1994, 115) notes that Pakistan’s offensive capabilities had qualitatively increased during the early 1960s as a direct consequence of its alliance with the United States. Pakistan military was in “possession of two-hundred M-47/48 Patton tanks, twelve high performance F-104A Starfighter and F-86 Sabre aircraft, twelve T-33 jet trainers with several of their Sabres equipped with state-of-the-art Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.”

Figure 3 shows the level of disagreement between India and Pakistan (figure a) and the level of fatal militarized interstate disputes (fatal MID) between India and Pakistan (figure b). The circular dots in figure b. indicate militarized disputes between India and Pakistan that were initiated by Pakistan while the bars show the number of battle deaths in each of the conflicts. The frequency of fatal MID is much higher between 1947 and 1972 than in the subsequent years and the level of UNGA disagreement was much higher from 1950 to roughly 1965 compared to any time period after that.

While the disagreement in the UN was never as high as it used to be until around 1965, it moderately spiked from time to time while the frequency of fatal MID declined but were not absent in the post 1972 period. Yet, the co-variation of the two variables is not perfect and we do

see instances where UNGA disagreement was low, but we still saw fatal MIDs. For instance, the UNGA disagreement was low between 1967 and 1972, but the 1971 war is till date the largest war fought between the two states where Pakistan lost its Eastern province which later became Bangladesh. That being said, there were minor spikes – not as high as pre-1965 levels – that were followed by fatal MIDs. For example, we see a spike in UNGA disagreement in 1963-64, 1982-83, and 1996-1997. We also see that there was a rise in the intensity of Fatal MIDs in 1965-66, 1984-85, and 1999. broadly speaking, lesser differences in UNGA voting occurred alongside fewer fatal MIDs but there were periods of exception. A causal link cannot be inferred as these spikes may be a consequence of other international and domestic processes beyond the scope of the paper, but these two variables, UNGA disagreement, and fatal MIDs seem to represent two dimensions of rivalry de-escalation.

Therefore, it is hard to conclusively ascertain whether the push for affinity leads to lower conflicts or whether the push for affinity is a consequence of dispute initiation. Based on the India-Pakistan case study, we do see conflict outbreak following spikes in UNGA disagreement, but generally speaking, the big push towards greater affinity came as a consequence of the 1971 war that proved to be a strategic shock for Pakistan. It is the strategic shock of losing territory rather than just dispute initiation that may have kept UNGA disagreement at lower levels – on average – in the post 1972 period.

The alliance patterns in the Indian Subcontinent were along the Cold War line. Pakistan was aligned with the United States as early as 1954 and 1955 when it became a signatory to the anti-Soviet SEATO and CENTO defense pacts. India on the other hand did not formally ally with the Soviet Union until 1971. Looking back at figure 3 we see that the intensity of Fatal MIDs initiated by Pakistan were done when Pakistan had a major power ally while India did not – although it was informally aligning with the Soviet Union from the early 1960s. Alliances became important during the Cold War because it allowed Pakistan to narrow down the asymmetry with India in terms of the quality of weapons platforms it was operating at the time (Dixit 2002). What emboldened Pakistan particularly during the 1960s was India's strategic vulnerability against China following its defeat in the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Furthermore, America's foreign policy interests in the Indian Subcontinent has been changing over time. During the early part of the Cold War the US was interested in limiting India's power in Asia due to its association with the Non-Aligned Movement and projected Pakistani influence in the Middle East and the Indian Subcontinent. This made the United States more tolerant of Pakistan's MID initiations against India (Kapur, 2005: 146-49). That said the United States was sympathetic to India during the Sino-Indian war of 1962 (Dixit, 2002).

In contrast, during 1999 Kargil war, the Americans were very quick to politically intervene. It is well known that it was American pressure and the threat of withholding a crucial developmental loan of 100 million dollars from the International Monetary Fund, that left Pakistan with no choice but to de-escalate and withdraw from the Line of Control. Strobe Talbott (2006) who was the Deputy Under Secretary of State in 1999 recounts:

“In late June [1999] Clinton called Nawaz Sharif to stress that the United States saw Pakistan as the aggressor and to reject the fiction that the fighters were separatist guerrillas. The administration let it be known that if Sharif did not order a pullback, we would hold up a \$100 million International Monetary Fund loan that Pakistan sorely needed. Sharif went to Beijing, hoping for comfort from Pakistan’s staunchest friend, but got none.” Talbott (2006) further recounts:

“He [Clinton] said it was crazy enough for Sharif to have let his military violate the Line of Control, start a border war with India, and now prepare nuclear forces for action. On top of that, he had put Clinton in the middle of the mess and set him up for a diplomatic failure...Sharif seemed beaten, physically and emotionally. He denied he had given any orders with regard to nuclear weaponry and said he was worried for his life.”

In the Kargil case, the United States, had a de-escalatory effect although did not lead rivalry termination. Moreover, the United States’ objective was not to broker rivalry termination but rather to avoid a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. What is more, in 1999, the United States was the only super-power left after the end of the Cold War which meant that its strategic circumstances were substantially different than they were during the Cold War. This leads us to the next section that looks into isolating the effects of the Cold War.

## The Cold War Effect

There are three parts to addressing the effect of the Cold War. First, I include the Cold War variable in my models as an important control variable that affects MID initiation and the prospects of decreasing affinity due to the Cold War dynamics. Statistically speaking, while the Cold War variable shows statistical significance in some models, the effect is not robust. For instance, Cold War positively predicts MID outbreaks at higher levels of asymmetry suggesting that external or systemic factors do influence dyad-level behavior. Table 10.0 shows that an alliance with the United States increases the probability of a state initiating conflict while the same cannot be said about an alliance with the Soviet Union. In table 5.1, Cold War is associated with a positive relationship with conflict outbreak in one of the models that accounts for extreme asymmetry (10:1). Cold War is associated with a decline in conflict severity between rivals in table 5.2 which indicates that the bi-polar system had some form of conflict management.

Also, as shown in tables 8.0 and 9.0, Cold War variable predicts that stronger rival dyads that fall above the seventy-fifth percentile, despite asymmetry, show greater probability of conflicts and greater levels of voting disagreements than weaker dyads that fall below the twenty-fifth percentile, despite asymmetry. When I further isolate the effect of a formal alliance with the United States or the Soviet Union/Russia, I do not find statistical significance for MID outbreaks. However, a lack of statistical significance does not mean that countries allied with the United States would narrow their voting differences with the USSR or vice-versa in certain cases.

Second, as the figure 4 shows, Pakistan, Turkey, and the Philippines (all formal defense allies of the United States as part of SEATO (1954) and CENTO (1955) ) for instance, showed high levels of disagreement with the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War in the 1950s, 1960s, and the 1970s, but steadily, over the years, reduced their UNGA voting disagreement with the USSR/Russia, especially after CENTO was dissolved in 1979 and SEATO dissolved in 1977 ( although Pakistan left SEATO in 1973). Countries such as Hungary and Poland on the other hand followed the same pattern as Russia when it came to their UNGA voting differences with the United States during the Cold War. India which was allied with the Soviet Union formally from 1971 shows more affinity towards the United States during the 1950s and 1960s but shows increasing differences with the United States during the 1970s, 1980s and particularly in the 1990s. India's level of disagreement with the United States during the 1990s is comparable with America's disagreement with the countries of the Soviet bloc/Eastern bloc during the Cold War. These patterns lead to a different set of question regarding what governed India-US relations during the Cold War and post-Cold War period which is outside the scope of this paper. However, their disagreement over India's nuclear weapons programs and America's approaches to nuclear nonproliferation may be a driver of greater foreign policy disagreement during this 1990s. But this requires greater examination elsewhere. Furthermore, why such variation in disagreement levels

between weaker states allied to the US or Russia is observed requires a theoretical explanation which is beyond the scope of this paper.

Observers correctly point out that one could imagine an alliance partner during the Cold War actively choosing not to act as a restraint in certain circumstances depending on the larger strategic circumstances. The previous section points out on how the nature of American intervention in South Asia changed depending on the strategic circumstances pertaining to the Cold War versus during the Kargil conflict in 1999 when the United States was the sole superpower. To further elaborate on that point, even in the 1962, the peak of the Cold War, the United States was more sympathetic towards India during the Sino-Indian war of 1962 given America’s hostilities towards Communist China. America not only agreed to some arms transfers to India, but also formally requested General Ayyub Khan of Pakistan to not escalate tensions with India (Dixit 2002). However, when it came to India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, the United States exerted pressure on India to agree to terms which were more favorable to Pakistan. What is more, during the 1971 war, the United States went to great lengths to stop India from intervening in East Pakistan to the extent of stationing the Seventh Fleet in the Bay of Bengal (Dixit 2002; Raghavan 2013). However, even during America’s support for India during the Sino – Indian conflict, it did not abandon its larger interest in bolstering Pakistan’s position in Central and South Asia.

Figure 4: Cold War Dynamics



Table 10.0: Survival Analysis (Cox Proportional Hazard Models)  
 Supplemental Section: Not for Publication

Variables	DV = Fatal MID	
	Haz. Rat.	Robust SE
Allied with USA	26.181***	21.950
Allied with Russia	2.414	1.554
USA/Russia Alliance	Na.	
Other rivals	1.064	0.297
Democratic Dyad	0.774	0.564
Multilateral Alliances	.884	0.186
Spatial Rivalry	1.122	0.329
Positional Rivalry	1.055	0.263
Major Power Dyad	2.083***	1.264
Contiguity	1.147 +	0.095
Cold War	1.983	0.570
N	2,850	
No. of Failures	71	
Log pseudolikelihood	-281.617	
Wald X <sup>2</sup>	56.66 ***	

+p< 0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Note: USA/Russia Alliance means one side is allied with USA and the other side is allied with Soviet Union.

Table 5.1: Survival Analysis (Cox Proportional Hazard Models)

Variables	DV = Weak Initiation (5:1 Asymmetry)		DV = Weak Initiation (10:1 Asymmetry)	
	Haz. Rat.	Robust SE	Haz. Rat.	Robust SE
Weaker State Allied	15.731***	9.714	7.15e-06	6.62e-06
Both states Allied	14.868***	8.587	32.880**	35.643
Stronger state Allied	20.587***	9.661	142.649***	114.348
Other rivals	1.110	0.427	0.817	0.531
Democratic Dyad	0.6100	0.418	0.221	0.287
Multilateral Alliances	1.504*	0.317	1.618*	0.316
Spatial Rivalry	2.385*	1.009	1.417	0.830
Positional Rivalry	1.179	0.458	2.296	1.399
Major Power Dyad	0.695	0.335	1.458	0.968
Contiguity	1.269 <sup>+</sup>	0.166	1.394	0.301
Cold War	1.107	0.408	0.399 <sup>+</sup>	0.197
Constant	NA		0.0007***	0.001
N	6,344		6,853	
No. of Failures	36		15	
Log pseudolikelihood	-146.028		-50.164	
Wald X <sup>2</sup>	80.07***		418.79***	

<sup>+</sup>p < 0.1, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Note: Model 5 is Weibull model. Cox model omitted the “weaker state allied” variable. As an alternative, “Weibull specification provides more flexibility than exponential hazard model that assumes hazard rate to be constant across time” (Colaresi, Rasler, Thompson, 2007: 146).

Table 5.2: OLS (DV = Conflict Severity (Maoz, 1982: 217-225))

Variables	Non-Rival Dyads		Rival Dyads	
	Coef.	PCSE	Coef.	PCSE
Weaker State Allied	-5.346*	2.251	-1.751	1.835
Both states Allied	1.741	2.160	3.695+	1.954
Stronger state Allied	4.033*	1.703	-2.647*	1.159
Other rivals	2.564	1.409	1.585	1.021
Democratic Dyad	1.293	3.219	-1.164	2.751
Multilateral Alliances	-3.682***	1.002	-3.895***	0.589
Spatial Rivalry	N/A		2.452*	1.125
Positional Rivalry	N/A		-1.799	1.357
Major Power Dyad	-9.009***	2.422	-4.250**	1.517
Contiguity	-1.181**	0.438	-1.248**	0.489
Cold War	-0.896	2.357	-3.349**	1.227
Constant	70.920***	1.829	75.087***	1.933
N	3,293		1,869	
R – Squared	0.0542		0.0692	

+p< 0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001



Table 8.0: Survival Analysis, Weibull Models DV = MID Initiation by Weaker state

Variables	Weak Dyads = 1		Strong Dyads = 1	
	Haz. Rat.	Robust SE	Haz. Rat.	Robust SE
Weaker State Allied	12.841***	8.831	23.057*	36.806
Both states Allied	59.728***	45.141	12.716*	14.330
Stronger state Allied	7.422 <sup>+</sup>	8.105	40.727*	62.335
Other rivals	3.187	3.717	0.878	0.959
Democratic Dyad	7.94e-07***	1.34e-06	6.699 <sup>+</sup>	7.678
Multilateral Alliances	0.812	0.600	0.905	0.538
Spatial Rivalry	4.922 <sup>+</sup>	12.468	8.454 <sup>+</sup>	4.481
Positional Rivalry	0.280	0.284	4.699**	2.701
Major Power Dyad	N/A		0.231*	0.160
Contiguity	1.553	0.419	1.611 <sup>+</sup>	0.468
Cold War	0.195 <sup>+</sup>	0.176	12.774***	9.206
Constant	0.006***	0.005	0.00003***	0.00006
N	659		1,344	
No. of Failures	6		11	
Log pseudolikelihood	-17.247		-22.925	
Wald X <sup>2</sup>	746.27***		169.45***	

+p< 0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Table 9.0: OLS with Panel Corrected Standard Errors

Variables	Weak Dyads = 1 (1)		Strong Dyads = 1 (2)	
	Coefficient	PCSE	Coefficient	PCSE
Weaker State Allied	-0.146	0.150	-0.091	0.135
Both states Allied	-0.359***	0.081	-0.532*	0.235
Stronger state Allied	-0.327***	0.086	1.528***	0.139
Other rivals	0.359***	0.071	0.625***	0.161
Democratic Dyad	-0.010	0.066	0.493***	0.083
Multilateral Alliances	-0.220***	0.027	-0.067	0.133
Spatial Rivalry	-0.081	0.060	-2.953***	0.096
Positional Rivalry	-0.107	0.090	1.904***	0.180
Major Power Dyad	N/A		0.598***	0.082
Fatal MID	0.016	0.137	-0.204	0.138
Contiguity	0.017	0.038	0.254**	0.074
Cold War	0.191***	0.044	0.475***	0.097
Constant	0.706***	0.055	0.008	0.234
N	421		286	
Number of Groups (Rival Dyads)	38		17	
R-Square	0.2765		0.8289	
Wald X <sup>2</sup>	224.98***		2260.61***	

+p< 0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

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