Scholars like Charles Tilly have argued that war-making is an important component of state-making, and many have found these two aspects to be positively associated with each other. However, the role of war on political economy has thrown up mixed results. I argue that being involved in rivalries can lead to improvements in state capacity which can improve power projection capabilities, required to be a great power. I broaden the debate to include the prospects of middle powers transitioning to great power status along with examining rivalry’s effect on state capacity. Furthermore, the rivalry mechanism is unpacked to consider the role of positional rivalries, where two states compete for regional influence, have a greater impact on building state capacity needed to make the transition to great power status. Positional rivalries, such as the ongoing Sino-Indian rivalry or the Sino-US rivalry may or may not include a territorial element to them, but they certainly involve states that seek to increase their regional influence. The argument discounts for the number of rivalries a state is involved in and what that does to a state’s chances of becoming a great power since the chances of great power transition would increase if a state has one or a few rivals, but will drop if the state faces a large number of rivals.
International Organizations and Conflict
This project considers the influence of international organizations on conflict de-escalation and the international profile of states. Post-World War II era has seen a proliferation of international organizations that have exerted their share of influence on state behavior. States value membership to certain kinds of international regimes and view them as a status symbol. For instance, countries like India, Brazil and Japan do value the idea of being included as permanent members of the UN Security Council. The recent inclusion of India in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was largely viewed within India as a major improvement in its world standing. To that end, the rise of middle powers in the twenty first century is occurring in the context of many international organizations that seek to affect state behavior. As much as membership to certain international organizations is seen as a status symbol, the question remains whether multilateral organizations contribute to conflict de-escalation by eliciting cooperation across various international issues, or do they become tools of statecraft where rival states pursue their interests off the battlefield and in various international institutions that do not elicit cooperation but cause deadlocks? To paraphrase Clausewitz, is war politics by other means, or is politics war by other means? Scholars have shown that international organizations do contribute to conflict de-escalation. Moreover, it is also possible that the deadlocks seen in international organizations are largely a function of strategic rivals competing for influence and power in such international forums and organizations.
Peaceful Rivalry Terminations
Extant scholarship has historically considered rivalry termination as a binary variable. Rasler et.al. (2013) show that rivalries can terminate with one side accepting inferiority, peacefully or coercively. Such rivalry terminations follow very different causal pathways. In other words, this project treats different types of rivalry termination as different classes of events rather than considering rivalry termination as a single phenomenon. While rivalries that end coercively may suffer from intractable territorial disputes, peaceful terminations may occur largely due to shifts in strategic priorities, changes in leadership or negotiations (Rasler et.al, 2013). Rivalry termination due to one side accepting inferiority has been classified as terminations along realist lines (Rasler et.al, 2013). In essence, such terminations were not due to negotiated settlements or because of changes in strategic priorities, but because one side wanted to avoid heavy losses in war. examples of cases that fall in this category are the China-Vietnam (1973-1991), France – United States (1830-1871) and Yemen – Saudi Arabia (1990-2000).
I intend to develop an explanation of peaceful rivalry terminations arguing that multilateral organizations and institutions of global governance shape strategic preferences of states in a way that: 1) broadens the conception of security interests that may change the strategic calculus vis-à-vis the rival states, 2) reduces the problems emanating from the logic of the commitment problem – a service international organizations were designed to provide and 3) providing essential platforms to rally international support, both diplomatic and military, for their causes. In the case of rising powers, they provide platforms that enable them to signal their (peaceful) intentions and help garner global support that sees them as new global leaders. With the most powerful states being members of many international organizations and also being involved in rivalries, explaining the relationship between rivalries and global integration of states through international organizations offers to make contributions to the study of international organizations and international conflict.
I intend to develop an explanation of peaceful rivalry terminations arguing that multilateral organizations and institutions of global governance shape strategic preferences of states in a way that: 1) broadens the conception of security interests that may change the strategic calculus vis-à-vis the rival states, 2) reduces the problems emanating from the logic of the commitment problem – a service international organizations were designed to provide and 3) providing essential platforms to rally international support, both diplomatic and military, for their causes. In the case of rising powers, they provide platforms that enable them to signal their (peaceful) intentions and help garner global support that sees them as new global leaders. With the most powerful states being members of many international organizations and also being involved in rivalries, explaining the relationship between rivalries and global integration of states through international organizations offers to make contributions to the study of international organizations and international conflict.
Publications:
Refereed Journal:
“The Indo – U.S. Civilian Nuclear Agreement: What’s The “Big Deal”? (Spring 2010) International Journal (Canadian International Council). Volume 65, Issue 2. pp - 435 - 448
With Vasabjit Banerjee.“Regime Type or Political Instability? Why Pakistan De-Escalates or Enters War” (2015). International Journal of World Peace, Vol. 32, No. 2,
Review Articles:
H-Diplo | ISSF Article Review 31: Review of: John Mitton. “The India−Pakistan Rivalry and Failure in Afghanistan. International Journal, 69:3 (2014): 353-376
“Book Review Analysis: Crude World: The Violent Twilight of Oil” & “Geopolitics of Oil.” Strategic Analysis, Volume 34, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 925 – 928
Other Works:
Taskforce Report on “Development of the Nuclear Energy Sector in India.” IDSA 2010
“Why Coal Matters in India?” IDSA Comment. June 1, 2010.
“The Indo – U.S. Civilian Nuclear Agreement: What’s The “Big Deal”? (Spring 2010) International Journal (Canadian International Council). Volume 65, Issue 2. pp - 435 - 448
With Vasabjit Banerjee.“Regime Type or Political Instability? Why Pakistan De-Escalates or Enters War” (2015). International Journal of World Peace, Vol. 32, No. 2,
Review Articles:
H-Diplo | ISSF Article Review 31: Review of: John Mitton. “The India−Pakistan Rivalry and Failure in Afghanistan. International Journal, 69:3 (2014): 353-376
“Book Review Analysis: Crude World: The Violent Twilight of Oil” & “Geopolitics of Oil.” Strategic Analysis, Volume 34, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 925 – 928
Other Works:
Taskforce Report on “Development of the Nuclear Energy Sector in India.” IDSA 2010
“Why Coal Matters in India?” IDSA Comment. June 1, 2010.
Working Papers:
“Competing for Greatness: How Rivalries Improve State Capacity.” With Shelli Israelsen. (Under Review)
“Strategic Rivalries in the Middle East.” With Shelli Israelsen (Under Review)
Blurring the Lines: Moving Beyond the Inter-Intra-State Conflicts Dichotomy.” With Shelli Israelsen. (In Preparation)
“How Institutional Linkages lead to Conflict and Rivalry De-escalation.” (In Preparation)
“When Doves Fight Hawks: Capability Offsets and Asymmetric Rivalries”. (In Preparation)
“Electoral Volatility and Communal Violence: Evidence from India.” (In Preparation)
“Strategic Rivalries in the Middle East.” With Shelli Israelsen (Under Review)
Blurring the Lines: Moving Beyond the Inter-Intra-State Conflicts Dichotomy.” With Shelli Israelsen. (In Preparation)
“How Institutional Linkages lead to Conflict and Rivalry De-escalation.” (In Preparation)
“When Doves Fight Hawks: Capability Offsets and Asymmetric Rivalries”. (In Preparation)
“Electoral Volatility and Communal Violence: Evidence from India.” (In Preparation)
